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Abstract 
This paper studies the way in which labor market fluctuations affect the transition to 
early retirement among older employees in Sweden via the practice of negotiated pen-
sions. The results indicate that downturns (upturns) in aggregated industry employment 
increases (decreases) the probability of early retirement. This result is driven by the 
public sector; in general the evidence is much weaker in the private sector. The results 
also suggest that the replacement levels immediately after early retirement are higher 
during declining as well as expanding industry employment. The results support an 
interpretation that 1) the employer and employee agreed on special early retirement pen-
sions, and 2) that these were used in order to persuade older employees to quit volun-
tarily, but also that they worked to reward older employees. 
Keywords: Retirement, fluctuating markets, buy-outs, demand for old workers. 
JEL-codes: J21, J26, J23, J14. 
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2  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees 1 Introduction 
In common with many other parts of the industrialized world, Sweden has experienced 
a prolonged period of gradual decline in labor force participation rates among elderly 
(male) workers. Likely reasons for this may be found in a gradual expansion of social 
security systems, an increase in real incomes, and maybe also a change in the prefer-
ences for the work-leisure trade off. However, there have also been substantial short-run 
fluctuations in addition to the long-run trend. In the early 1990s, the labor force partici-
pation rate in the 60-64 age group declined quite rapidly (both for men and women), 
while, since 1996 until to the present day, the participation rate of this age group has in 
fact increased; in 2005, it was as high as in the late 1980s. It is quite possible that the 
later observations are due to changes in the business cycle. During the first half of the 
1990s, Sweden experienced a substantial economic downturn that, in many respects, 
represented the biggest crisis since the 1930s. As a result, many sectors were restruc-
tured, many workers became unemployed, and a fair share of old workers embarked on 
permanent retirement before their normal retirement age. By the end of the 1990s, the 
situation changed and the economy recovered.  
Economic studies that analyze the retirement decision are typically based on utility 
maximization for the individual, and the focus is mainly on the effects of changes in 
pensions and earnings on the decision to retire
1. Commonly, utility (profit) maximiza-
tion for the employer is ignored. The notion that employer aspects have a significant 
impact on retirement in addition to individual characteristics is not often considered in 
studies of this nature. It is nevertheless quite plausible that decisions about retirement 
are not solely taken by the worker, but may involve a joint decision on the part of the 
employee and the employer (for a survey of relevant literature see Section 2.1).  
The present paper studies the effect of changes in aggregate residual employment 
(the deviation in aggregate employment from the long run trend) on the transition from 
work to early retirement. The aim of this paper is to explore an alternative explanation 
for retirement in addition to individual economic incentives, namely that the demand 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Gruber and Wise (2004), Hurd (1990), and the references therein, or Hakola (2003), for a survey. Hallberg 
(2007) is a suvey of the labor supply and demand of the elderly with focus on Sweden. 
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An employer continuously faces economic fluctuations, and the work place is therefore 
constantly in a transformation and restructuring process that involves personnel 
changes. One plausible hypothesis is that declines (expansions) in macro employment 
will increase (decrease) the probability of early withdrawal from the labor market. One 
reasonable interpretation is that labor demand seems to have an important influence on 
early retirement behavior.
2 Moreover, more favorable compensation packages in times 
when aggregate employment is declining appear to indicate that employers are more 
motivated to persuade old workers to retire, since the formulation of a specific early 
retirement package may be a result of a negotiation. In the US, comparable retirement 
programs are known as early retirement windows, see Brown (2002). To further our 
understanding of whether employers offer higher pensions to encourage individuals to 
retire early, the second aim of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship 
between the observed pension replacement rate for recently retired persons and aggre-
gate employment. The empirical part of the paper employs a large longitudinal income-
register data set at the individual level for the period 1992-2000. These data are merged 
with macro-level data on aggregate employment.  
This study focuses on how early withdrawal based on occupational pensions has 
been used to adjust employment in the 1990s. Early retirement can also be financed in 
other ways, usually by being granted a disability pension which normally is for health 
reasons. The reason for focusing on an early claim for an occupational pension is that 
this is primarily voluntary, and is not health-induced (as in the case of a disability pen-
sion). 
3.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Previous research and relevant institu-
tional background to early retirement in Sweden, with a particular focus on occupational 
                                                 
2 Aggregate employment is a reasonably good indicator of employers’ demand for labor, since it proxies for 
economic fluctuations. However, individuals may become discouraged in their job search by a decline in aggregate 
employment, so there may also be an impact on the supply of labor. The magnitude of this latter effect is presumably 
small compared to the former effect.  
3 Early claims for a public old age pension are very rare. See Section 2.3 for a description of the rules in Sweden, and 
Section 4.1 of this paper for an empirical description. For a further discussion and empirical description of alternative 
income security systems (unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, and disability insurance) which may, in 
practice, have been used as voluntary early retirement vehicles, see Wadensjö and Sjögren (2000), Palme and 
Svensson (2004) and Hallberg (2003). 
4  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees pensions, is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical model, specifica-
tions and the data. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains 
concluding remarks.  
2  Institutional setting and research 
background 
2.1  Why sack the old? 
One might wonder why employers find it economically sound to get rid of old employ-
ees. These workers should on the contrary be quite attractive as they possess long 
experience, knowledge, and a wide network of contacts. There might be both economic 
as well as social reasons. One driving factor that pushes elderly workers out of the labor 
market in Sweden might be that this category of employees is often associated with 
higher labor costs in relation to younger personnel and relative to productivity. A higher 
labor cost might arise because, e.g., older workers have high wages, sometimes higher 
pension premiums, and a higher expected absence due to illness. 
In an economic downturn, the employer might thus see a chance to restructure the 
firm’s labor force by getting rid of older workers, and thus minimizing labor costs. The 
employer might see long-run benefits in the restructuring of the age profile of the work 
force independently of current economic turbulence. Early retirement may also permit 
continued employment of younger staff members. The individual might, moreover, feel 
forced by social norms to make way for younger workers. In addition, this kind of 
settlement may also be more socially acceptable than a downright dismissal of an older 
employee. 
In Sweden, the “first-in last-out” rule hinders such measures (see Section 2.3). In 
Sweden, employees with high seniority are protected by labor market legislation from 
being laid off in the event of redundancy (the “first-in last-out” rule). If he or she is laid 
off due to shortage of work, a worker also has the right of precedence in case of re-
opening of similar jobs at their former employer. Therefore, in order to persuade some 
older employees to quit voluntarily, the employer and employee can agree upon a 
special early retirement pension (a so-called “buy-out”) (see Section 2.3). Such private 
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(as agreed by the unions and employers’ associations). 
2.2 Research  background 
Firms’ decisions to hire and lay off (offer early retirement to) older workers have 
received less attention until recently, mainly because of the lack of suitable data. 
Feldstein (1976, 1978), Topel (1984) and Hutchens (1999) are often mentioned as 
pioneers in introducing the concept of the employer’s influence on the individual 
employee’s retirement decision. The employee acts as in a labor supply model, and 
decides whether to retire, based on the attributes of the alternatives. To some extent, the 
employer can determine the alternatives’ attributes. Some new papers (cf. Behaghel et 
al., 2005, Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001, and Hakola and Uusitalo, 2005) study how 
redundancy costs or hiring cutbacks targeted at specific groups (e.g. older workers) 
affect labor demand, and find evidence that changes in costs or regulations for certain 
kinds of labor affect the demand for such employees. 
A recent example of work that is highly related to the present paper is Coile and 
Levine (2007), which examines how local unemployment affects retirement. They find 
that retirements only increase in response to an economic downturn when workers 
become eligible for social security, suggesting that retirement benefits might function as 
a sort of unemployment insurance. They make a distinction between the retirement 
decision and the claiming of social security benefits (which is not done in the present 
study), thus interpreting the results more in terms of labor supply responses to macro 
shocks rather than responses in the way employers vary the retirement options which 
the individual can choose. Another paper, however, which is less closely related but 
which also focuses on macro-level factors that influence retirement behavior is Coile 
and Levine’s (2006) paper on how stock market fluctuations affect retirement behavior 
among older individuals via wealth shocks. 
Eklöf and Hallberg (2004) find for Sweden that early retirees with withdrawals of 
occupational pension frequently faced better retirement options in terms of the 
6  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees replacement rate than the standard agreement text seems to suggest.
 4 Thus there seems 
to be room within the standard contracts for a negotiation of the pension levels. Eklöf 
and Hallberg (2006) estimate that the early retirement probabilities (into occupational 
pension schemes) would decrease by 10-30 percent if these favorable early retirement 
pensions were not applied. A natural extension to their work is to examine more deeply 
the causes for these pensions, in which periods and in sectors of the economy such 
pension supplements are paid, as in the present study. 
Some authors (Wadensjö and Sjögren, 2000) conclude that early retirement packages 
became increasingly popular in Sweden during the 1990s, especially in the central gov-
ernment sector. In 1996, the central government in Sweden employed about 9 percent of 
the workforce, but accounted for about 35 percent of the total of some 52,000 individu-
als who were estimated to be early occupational pensioners (Landin, 1997). Eklöf and 
Hallberg (2006) estimate that for the period 1992-2000, 21 percent of all 60-64 year 
olds in the central government sector had an occupational pension as their main source 
of income. This was also frequent among employees in the local government sector and 
white collar workers in the private sector (with corresponding shares of 12 and 10 per-
cent, respectively). 
Adjustment of the workforce in a fluctuating market might involve “recalls”, that is, 
rehiring of recently laid off staff that possesses high tenure status in the company, and 
temporary job contracts. Idson and Valletta (1996) find that, in the US, tenure (which 
usually correlates with age) increases recall probability, but this effect is reduced by 
sectoral employment decline to a large extent. Labor market arrangements offering job 
security are thus less binding in fluctuating markets. In Sweden, however there is a 
“last-in last-out” rule that is supposed to protect senior workers from dismissal, thus 
making it a less straightforward to translate Idson and Valletta’s (1996) results for the 
US into a Swedish context. However, Holmlund and Storrie (2002) argue that, as a 
result of the economic downturn, temporary jobs became much more frequent in 
Sweden during the 1990s. 
                                                 
4 According to Eklöf and Hallberg (2004), there seems to be a spread in realized pension replacements of those that 
took an early exit via occupational pension that was unaccounted for in the standard agreements. 
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The Swedish income-security system provides several sources of income which can be 
used to finance early labor market withdrawal: public old-age pension, occupational 
old-age pension, unemployment insurance, sickness insurance, and disability insurance. 
This analysis focuses on early retirement via the old age pension system, in particular 
early retirement options via the occupational old-age pension systems. Relevant for the 
study are also job security agreements and job protection legislation in Sweden. As the 
empirical analysis is limited to 1992-2000, we focus on the systems in effect during this 
time period. 
2.3.1  The public old-age pension 
During the 1990s, Sweden’s national old-age pension consisted of a basic component 
and a supplementary component. All Swedish citizens and all persons residing in 
Sweden were entitled to the basic pension. It provided roughly the same amount 
regardless of previous earnings, but was reduced if the individual had resided in Sweden 
for less than 40 years or had a Swedish work history less than 30 years.
5  T h e  
supplementary component was determined by the individual’s earnings history, and 
constituted 60 percent of the average income below the social security income ceiling 
during the 15 years with the highest earnings. The normal retirement age was 65. It was 
possible to claim old-age pension early, starting at the age of 60 (the age was raised to 
61 in 1998), or postpone receipt until the age of 70. Early withdrawal reduced such pen-
sions by an actuarial adjustment of 0.5 percent per month. It was also possible to claim 
early part-time retirement pension (abolished by the end of 2000). 
2.3.2 Occupational  pensions 
Central agreements for occupational pension are mandatory for approximately 
95 percent of the labor market. There are basically four different occupational pension 
plans, covering different areas of the labor market: blue-collar workers in the private 
                                                 
5 Most benefits in the Swedish social security system, but also including the occupational pensions, are price indexed 
by a so-called “base amount” (BA). Until 1999, the BA was determined for one year at a time by the Swedish 
Parliament, closely following the consumer price index. Since 1999, the BA was renamed the “price base amount”, 
and has since been linked fully to consumer price movements. In 1999 1 BA was 36,400 SEK, or approximately 
3,900 Euro. 
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local government employees. Although there are some important differences between 
the sector-specific agreements, the way in which benefits are defined is fairly similar. 
The usual case is to define benefits as a function of previous sector-specific earnings, 
the years of service, and the age of retirement. The aim of occupational pensions is to 
compensate income losses above the social security ceiling that the national public pen-
sion system does not cover. For that reason, the occupational pension benefit rates are 
fairly low (about 10%) in the income intervals in which the public pension system 
applies. 
The pension qualifying income is a key variable in determining pension entitlements 
in the occupational pension system. With minor variations across labor market sectors, 
this is a function of the earnings a period of years before retirement and number of years 
of service within the relevant labor market sector. The pension entitlements are propor-
tionately reduced if the number of years of service is less than 30. 
With the exception of occupational pensions for blue-collar workers in the private 
sector prior to 1996, the occupational pension can also be claimed early from the age of 
60.
6 There is an actuarial adjustment of the same magnitude as for early receipt of pub-
lic old-age pension. The compensation levels before the normal retirement age may, 
however, be sufficiently high to support early retirement without simultaneously 
claiming a public pension. It is also noteworthy that significant groups in the Swedish 
labor market, particularly in the state and local government sectors, have a lower man-
datory retirement age via their occupation pension plan that gives them the right to 
claim a pension without the actuarial adjustment due to early withdrawal. As a result, 
employees in such occupations collect a full-time occupational pension until they reach 
the mandatory retirement age in the national old-age pension system. 
                                                 
6 In 1996 the STP plan was renegotiated and became SAF-LO, which is a defined contribution (DC) plan. The earliest 
withdrawal is now possible at the age of 55 (according to transition rules the earliest withdrawal age is at the age of 
60). SAF-LO is flexible as regards the period of payment - it can take the form of a life-long annuity or may be paid 
for a shorter period. There were also changes in occupational pensions for local government employees during the 
study period. A new pension agreement for local government employees (PFA-98) was negotiated in 1998. 
Compared to the previous system, it is organized along the lines of a defined contribution (DC) plan. 
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Within the agreements for white collar workers in the private, state, and local govern-
ment sectors, it is possible for employers and employees to enter into individual agree-
ments with more favorable replacement rates if the employee agrees to leave his or her 
employment early. As mentioned Sweden has relatively strong labor market protection 
for elderly worker. This early retirement pension can be used as a tool for the employer 
to persuade the employee to leave his or her employment before normal retirement age, 
which usually means that the employer gives the employee stronger incentives to retire 
than stipulated in the terms of standard agreements. 
The exact terms of an early retirement pension contract are unknown. Each contract 
is, in principle, negotiable and may therefore be individually designed, although 
employers have been known to make uniform offers to a group of employees 
(cf. Fölster, et al., 2001). Presumably, one condition in the early retirement pension is 
that the individual is not “punished” later in life for early retirement. Hence, the early 
retirement pensions compensate for future losses in pension benefit levels after the 
normal pension age of 65 as a result of early withdrawal. 
From the viewpoint of a specific business operation there may be several logical 
explanations as to why early retirement pension solutions are economically favorable 
instead of continued employment (cf. SOU, 2004). Compared to wage payments, pen-
sions are usually are lower, with a lower payroll tax, and are company tax-deductible 
(below the cap, up to about 80 percent of previous earnings). In addition, the employer 
has to pay pension premiums which are related to wages, and, in some pension schemes, 
also to the employee’s age, which makes premiums particularly high for older workers. 
The individual, on the other hand, might value paid leisure time. Furthermore, in the 
case of high income earners with incomes above the cap who pay central government 
tax, work incentives are weak, because the implicit tax on continued earnings is high 
(see Palme and Svensson, 2003, for a calculation of pension wealth accruals). 
2.3.3  Job security agreements 
In addition, in the central government sector there is a job security agreement 
(Trygghetsavtalet) which gives an employee a special pension (pensionsersättning) in 
case of dismissal due to redundancy. Usually the employee has to be at least 60 of age, 
10  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees although in special cases the rules also provide for a pension as early as 55 (e.g., for 
regular officers). This special pension may be granted even though dismissal was not 
due to a redundancy situation. The conditions are then that this person must be aged 60, 
voluntarily accept retirement, and that a younger person can be offered continued 
employment.
  7 In other parts of the Swedish labor market there are more general 
arrangements in the case of dismissal due to redundancy, but they are less favorable for 
older workers, in comparison with the state sector.
8
2.3.4 Employment  protection 
In Sweden employees are granted employment protection through legislation (law of 
security of employment, LAS). The rules stipulate, among other things, that dismissal 
can only be made on grounds of fact. This means that only matters that hinders the 
employee to carry out the assignments for which he or she is hired to do may be consid-
ered as “grounds of fact” for dismissal. However, the employer must first find try to 
find alternative tasks for the employee, or, in case of sickness, first provide with sub-
stantial rehabilitation for the employee. The law also stipulates the “last-in last-out” 
rule, which specify the order of priority in case of dismissal. Seniority years after age 45 
is double counted, hence strengthening the protection of older individuals. 
The law is compulsory. It is however possible for employers and employees to enter 
into other, less binding, terms trough collective agreements. There is a series of excep-
tions to the “last-in last-out” rule, and it may furthermore be set aside via settlements 
with the local union. During period of notice and nine months ahead, the dismissed has 
a right of precedence to re-employment with the same company in case of a new 
vacancy. It is up to the individual and not the union to claim this right.
9
                                                 
7 According to Nyman and Valck (2006), the cost of these pension payments in the state sector alone amounted to 
SEK 1.7 billion (180 million Euro) annually in 2000-2005. They claim that although the granting of new early 
pensions are forecasted to decline the cost will remain high for a several years a head. 
8 For instance, in the SAF-PTK plan, the analogue is Trygghetsrådet. Before 2004, it replaced income losses for a 30-
month period for workers aged 60-64 who became unemployed due to redundancy. See Sjögren-Lindquist and 
Wadensjö (2005) for details of the rules. 
9 However, this rule is not always followed in practice, particularly not in the case of older workers. Ulander-
Wänman (2005) studies applications of this principle. A reoccurring argument for not re-hiring a person with right of 
precedence was that he or she did not comply with the job qualifications required. 
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  11 3  Empirical identification strategy and data 
3.1 Empirical  model 
In the typical retirement study, the focus is on the interpretation of economic incentives 
in a more or less structural model. This is however not the prime interest here. Rather, 
we would like to establish if there is a link between aggregate employment, and thus 
indirectly to labor demand, and individual retirement choices. We would also like to 
assess whether employers act via extra pensions to persuade old workers to retire. This 
can be the case if we observe higher pensions and more retirements in times when 
aggregate employment is below the normal level, and thus demand is low. 
3.1.1  Transitions from work into retirement 
The empirical strategy is simple, in that we compare differences in retirement behavior 
arising from the fact that individuals are assigned different outcomes of (industry-level) 
labor demand. Given the nature of the aggregate demand – it is exogenous – and the 
quality of the data, we argue that it is likely that we are identifying a casual relationship 
between labor demand and individual retirement. The first question is addressed by 
estimating the retirement hazard in the following form:  
 
1' aijt ijt a jt j t aijt yX Z β ϕγ θυε = ++ +++ ,   (1) 
 
where  =1 if individual i aged a affiliated to industry j in time t retires, and 0 in other 
cases. The retirement decision is thus treated as a discrete dichotomous choice. We 
assume retirement is terminal, thereby neglecting possible mobility between sectors or 
other types of non-retirement. The retirement hazard is a function of individual (and 
potentially household) characteristics  , an age-specific effect 
aijt y
ijt X a ϕ , the aggregate 
labor demand  jt Z  (defined so that if  jt Z <0 then labor demand is low, otherwise it is 
high), an industry fixed effect  j θ , a time-specific fixed effect  t υ , and an idiosyncratic 
shock  aijt ε  with  ( ) 0 aijt E ε = . 
12  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees Equation (1) is applied to all observations where  0 1 , , , 1 = − − t j i a y . By including age-
specific effects (the ϕ :s), the relationship can effectively be understood as a discrete-
time proportional hazard model, where the ϕ :s can be understood as the baseline 
hazard. The key parameter of interest is γ . If retirement is made prematurely (post-
poned) in downturns (upturns) in aggregate labor demand, then γ <0. 
We simplify by estimating (1) as a linear probability model (LPM). The parameter 
estimates may then be interpreted as marginal effects. Further, a probit or a logit will be 
inconsistent if there is heteroscedastic error structure.
10 Since the dependent variable is 
a dichotomous variable, the usual standard errors will be severely biased. Therefore 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used instead. 
Presumably  aijt ε  contains an unobserved individual (time-invariant) effect that influ-
ences retirement and covariates. These could be, e.g., health status, productivity, or 
personal attitudes towards retirement. 
11 Such effects may bias the estimate of γ  unless 
they are removed. However, it is not straight-forward how to interpret, estimate, and 
remove a fixed effect in the present setting. 
3.1.2  The employment residual: aggregate labor demand 
In this study, the labor demand is measured as the residual in the aggregate employ-
ment, defined as follows. The difficulty lies in determining the long run trend in 
employment. We go about this by expressing the log of employment in industry j at 
time t, ln jt e , as a polynomial in t,  ( ) j gt , a constant, and a residual component  jt Z : 
 
( ) ln jtj j eg t α =+ + j t Z .     (2) 
 
The residual,  jt Z , will be positive if there is an expansion and negative if there is a 
decline vis-à-vis the trend. We predict the residual employment from (2) as the ordinary 
                                                 
10 Probit estimates with and without random individual effects gave, nonetheless, mostly, the same qualitative results. 
11 Unobserved time-variant effects may also bias the model. The fact that one cannot control for unobserved time-
variant effects might affect how we see an industry (or a company), as the mere composition of workers in an 
industry (or company) might change how it function, and, in extension, a determinant for aggregate labor demand. 
There may be network effects (in a company or in another type of network) that over time accelerate or decelerate 
employees’ preferences for retirement (social norm formation).  
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  13 least square (OLS) residual, 
)
jt Z . This variable can then be used in (1) in place of the 
true  jt Z  in (1). 
12 Note that each industry is assumed to have its own trend. This means 
that some of the period-effect will be captured by the employment residual. Notice also 
that the choice of   is more or less arbitrary, but may be important for the results, 
since it – naturally – will influence the employment residual. To examine the robustness 
of the results in the empirical analysis, it will be assumed that 
() j gt
( ) j gt  is either quadratic 
or linear in t. 
As will be described the estimation samples for (1) and (2) differ. While estimation 
of (1) is locked to the period over which micro data are available, estimation of (2) is 
not. In the present case the micro data is for 1992-2000 (see Section 3.2), which was, as 
described in the introduction, characterized by a major downturn in the economy. From 
1992 to 2000, the employment was largely rising from a record low level (non-
employment reached its highest peak in 1993). For the identification of the effect of 
interest, it is important that the trend, and thus the key regressor, is estimated over a 
long period, which covers both upturns and downturns in the economy. If not, the trend 
will not represent ‘normal employment’. 
For this reason we use data from a longer period, between 1987 and 2004 (see Sec-
tion 3.3), for the estimation of the time trend (2), hence including a relatively balanced 
period that spans both economic upturns (the late 1980s and the turn of the millennium) 
and downturns (the start and middle of the 1990s). It is therefore likely that the variation 
in the residual employment measure is measuring what we really want. 
3.1.3  Realized pension attributes for early retirees 
The second question we would like to address is whether pensions are “boosted” in 
declining regimes of sectoral employment. As mentioned, one way of persuading older 
employees to quit voluntarily is for the employer and the older employee to agree on a 
special early retirement pension (a “buy-out”). A priori we cannot know to what extent 
benefits are negotiable and thus may diverge from the standard contracts in practice. 
                                                 
12 However, since the predicted residual is a generated regressor, the covariance matrix has to be adjusted accordingly 
(cf. Wooldrige, 2006). For simplicity this has not been done. 
14  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees The usual assumption in the literature in the field is, however, that all benefits follow 
the standard formula. Eklöf and Hallberg (2004, 2006) show, nevertheless, that there is 
a spread in realized occupational pension benefits. 
One way of examining this question is to examine the group of employees that took 
an early retirement via the occupational pension in the following regression model:  
 
22 2 ln ln ijt ijt p jt w ijt ijt PX Z W α βγβ ε =+ + + +    (3) 
 
where   is the first (full) year of pension benefit for an individual i who has retired 
early with occupational pension,   is the pension qualifying income,   is a vector 
of covariates, and 
ijt P
ijt W ijt X
2ijt ε  is an error term with zero expectation. Zjt is as before the labor 
demand in industry j at time t, which is again the employment residual is a proxy for. As 
mentioned above, the pension qualifying income is crucial for the calculation of pension 
benefit level in the occupational pension agreement. In principle, we would expect   
to explain the major part of the variation in pension benefits. Note that it is important to 
control for time period, labor market sector (type of occupational plan), education level, 
and industry. This is done via  . These control at lest partly for the fact that there are 
sub-agreements within the four major agreements for some occupational groups and that 
some agreements have changed during the period. 
ijt W
ijt X
If  0 p γ < , then individuals who retired in declining markets received a higher pen-
sion benefit, given their pension qualifying income. This could be because employers 
offered “buy-outs” - pension supplements - to induce employees to accept retirement. 
It is also possible for some companies and time periods that  0 p γ > . Those employers 
with good economic circumstances may regard extra pensions as rewards to senior 
employees. These pensions may be costly but the employer can afford them just 
because economic conditions are relatively favorable. Note that, the above specification 
is elaborated in the empirical analysis to allow for a nonlinear relationship between the 
pension benefit level and labor demand. 
It might also be – however less likely so – that individuals with high pension 
replacements ratios are more frequently inclined to retire in a declining or an expanding 
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  15 market than others. In order to determine which interpretation is more plausible we 
would ideally need to observe individuals entering into retirement more than once and 
in more than one regime of sectoral employment. However, since very few ever return 
to the labor market after old age retirement this is hardly ever possible. 
Also one may to some extent consider   and  ijt W jt Z  as jointly determined by the pre-
vailing economic situation, i.e., wages and pension qualifying income are a function of 
jt Z . Since we do not control for this mechanism, the partial effect of  jt Z  on ln   
would be biased towards zero. Hence, with this reasoning, if we find empirical evidence 
of a direct effect, i.e., if 
ijt P
0 ≠ p γ , it is likely that the true effect is bigger. However, if 
anything we believe that the demand effect via   is probably small, at least when 
markets are declining. Then cutbacks are more likely to realize in personnel reductions 
than wage cuts. 
ijt W
3.2 Micro  data 
Data from The Longitudinal INdividual DAta set (LINDA) are used. LINDA is a large 
micro-data set drawn from income registers and population censuses.
13 It consists of a 
large panel of individuals - about 300,000 individuals annually or about 3 percent of the 
population - which is representative of the Swedish population from 1960 and onwards. 
The data base also contains information on all family members for a sampled individ-
ual, as long as they remain in the household. In this paper, only sampled individual are 
used. The sample is limited to the 59-67 age group (for some of the description the age 
group 50-70 will be used though) in the years 1992-2000.
14 As usual, it is often difficult 
to classify self-employed individuals in terms of work or retirement (according to our 
definitions) due to tax legislation rules. To avoid these “income declaration problems”, 
individuals who had an income from active business operations during the study period 
are excluded. 
Because administrative register data such as LINDA contain no direct information on 
individual retirement status there is an issue regarding how to identify labor market 
                                                 
13 For more information about LINDA, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). 
14 Age is recorded on December 31 each year. 
16  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees status when using these data. In this analysis, individuals are classified as out of work in 
year t if work income in t is less than 1 basic amount (BA) and work income is not the 
major source of income (in 1999, 1 BA was SEK 36,400, or approximately 3,900 Euro). 
To simplify, we aggregate income into the following six categories: Work, unemploy-
ment (UI), sickness and disability (SI+DI), public old-age pension (OAP), occupational 
old-age pension (OCCUP), and capital incomes and transfers (OTHER).
15 Which 
income category (except work) the individual used for early withdrawal is determined 
by the maximum income source in the year in which the individual had a work income 
of less than 1 BA ( i.e., year t). 
LINDA contains annual data. Therefore, we cannot perfectly observe the timing of 
outcomes as we cannot distinguish between part-of-the-year effects and part-time 
effects. One approach is to study 3-year panels. Year t-2 the individual is checked as 
relevant or not for the retirement decision (i.e., has labor income above 1 BA). Year t-1 
is regarded as the transition or decision year, while the outcome is observed in t. The 
income records in t-1 are not used. The aggregate labor demand that is the appropriate 
covariate in (1) is therefore that in t-1. Hence, in estimation, aggregate labor demand is 
lagged.  
A further reason to lag aggregate labor demand is that otherwise it is functionally 
related to the individual choice. If the individual is a subgroup of the aggregate we 
would, by construction, get a negative correlation between the aggregate and the indi-
vidual outcome. However, even without lagging, this is presumably a minor problem 
because in our case the aggregate labor demand measure relies on employment in age 
groups 16-64, not just individuals near old age retirement. Further, the labor demand 
measure relies on a different data source (see below). 
We must hence observe the same individual for at least three consecutive and unin-
terrupted periods, in which the classification has to be ‘working’ in the first period.  
                                                 
15 The exact definitions of these six categories are given in the appendix, Table A1. See the discussion in Hallberg 
(2003) who uses the same data and makes a comparison of some different retirement definitions. The same source 
briefly describes the incidence of contemporaneous combinations of income sources. Further, see Hakola (2003) for a 
discussion of the subjective concept of retirement. 
 
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  17 A few data imputations were necessary. As described in the institutional background the 
affiliation to labor market sector, and thus the type of occupational pension agreement, 
is vital in the analysis. For some groups register information can be used directly to 
code sector affiliation since it was directly coded in the data. Labor market membership 
for the privately employed had to be imputed, however, since, white and blue collar 
workers were coded in the same category.
16 The pension qualifying income was esti-
mated as the mean of the previous five years of annual taxable income as long as the 
individual is working. For the first years in the panel the microdata was backed back in 
time so that the mean relies on five years for all. Once individuals retire and start 
claiming pension, qualification for pension entitlements ends. Therefore, the estimate on 
qualifying income was “frozen” (not updated) for preceding data years after the first 
year occupational pension was observed being claimed. We assume furthermore that all 
employees have full earnings history. This may potentially bias the pension qualifying 
income upwards for groups with less than full earnings history (e.g. women). This 
means in turn that the replacement rate (i.e. the pension divided by the qualifying 
income) will be biased downwards for these groups.
17
3.3 Macro  data 
Data on industry-specific employment are available from the labor force surveys 
(Statistics Sweden). These data include all age groups between 16 and 64. In this study, 
the data is annual for the period 1987-2004. In most cases, two-digit (sometimes three-
digit), SNI-code level data were used.
 18 For some industries, the data were aggregated, 
presumably because they were small, while for others a three-digit SNI-code level was 
                                                 
16 First we determine affiliation by examining the source of occupational pension once retired, which directly lead to 
the type of occupational pension agreement. (A few individuals had multiple claims from more than one occupational 
pension source. These were dropped.) For central and local public-sector employees who did not retire within the data 
panel, register information can be used directly to code sector affiliation. For private employees – who could belong 
to either the white or blue collar private sector – and who did not retire within the micro data window it was not 
possible to use register information since, as mentioned, white and blue collar workers were coded in the same 
category. Therefore predictions from a logit equation were used, with taxable income, gender, education, and 
industry, and interactions, as explanatory variables. The logit equation was estimated for privately employed 
individuals who were observed to retire. The imputation was then the predictions from this model including a 
stochastic term. The share of correct predictions was about 75 percent.  
17 Further, taxable income includes other income than what is relevant for occupational pension entitlements in the 
current sector, for instance, the earned income from another labor market sector.  
18 SNI is based on the European Community, NACE (Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community) standard. SNI is primarily classified on the basis of activity, which means that a company or a place of 
work can have several SNI-codes.  
18  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees used (e.g., for Health and social work, code 85, which is divided into Human health 
activities and Veterinary activities, code 851 and Social work activities with and without 
accommodation, code 853). Altogether, 71 industries were included. 
In the appendix, Table A2, the number of individual-year observations in the 
estimation sample is given, by industry and collective agreement. There is also 
information on the aggregation of industries, i.e., from which subgroups industries were 
aggregated. For the most part, there are overlaps, so that most types of collective 
agreements are represented in all industries, but this is not always the case. It may be 
noted that a large part of the individual-year observations for local government 
employees are classified in only a few (but big!) industries. For other labor market 
sectors, there is much more variation in the industry affiliation. 
4 Empirical  results 
4.1  General pattern of the data 
4.1.1  Income categories by age 
In Table 1, Panel A, the distribution over income categories is shown for the age group 
50-70 using the above definition. It may be noted, as expected, that the proportion of 
individuals with work income as their maximum source of income falls dramatically by 
age; from 82 percent at the age of 50 to 28 percent at the age of 64. At the age of 65, 
transitions from work – and also from the other income categories presented here – are 
mainly to national old age pension. After the age of 65, less than 2 percent retain a work 
status. It is also evident from data that occupational pension constitutes a significant 
path into early retirement. As the table shows, this route becomes increasingly impor-
tant around the age of 60, and reaches its highest proportion (18 percent) at the age of 
64. Closer inspection shows that occupational pension is persistent before the age of 65 
(very few return to work or utilize another benefit). 
Nevertheless, the proportion that depends either on disability insurance (DI), sickness 
benefits after the 14
th day (SI), and unemployment benefits (UI), is superior in size. It 
increases from about 14 percent at the age of 50 to about 40 percent at the age of 64. 
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  19 The largest group consists of recipients of DI or SI, and the major part of this increase is 
inflow to DI. An investigation of the data shows that practically no DI recipients ever 
return to work. It also shows that the probability of re-employment of an unemployed 
older worker falls in line with age. However, unemployment does not constitute the 
same type of permanent state until the “normal” retirement age of 65, since unemployed 
individuals opt for early retirement before their 65
th birthday (the disqualification age 
for these insurances is in the month of the 65
th birthday). 
Table 1 Income categories by age, 1992-2000, percent, maximum source of income 
  Panel A. Stock 










Other Total  Obs. 
50 82.35  8.87  4.85 0.00  0.04  3.88  100.00  34598   
51 81.83  9.83  4.67 0.00  0.04  3.63  100.00  33861   
52 81.04  10.55  4.61 0.00  0.05  3.75  100.00  32768   
53 80.19  11.46  4.45 0.00  0.07  3.84  100.00  31710   
54 79.30  12.40  4.41 0.00  0.08  3.81  100.00  30431   
55 77.63  13.63  4.50 0.00  0.16  4.07  100.00  28959   
56 75.27  15.11  4.68 0.00  0.54  4.39  100.00  27510   
57 72.71  16.94  4.80 0.00  0.88  4.67  100.00  25942   
58 69.66  19.07  5.16 0.00  1.31  4.80  100.00  24673   
59 65.63  21.79  5.28 0.00  2.11  5.19  100.00  23658   
60 60.22  24.62  5.49 0.24  3.80  5.63  100.00  23083   
61 51.49  27.80  5.51 0.97  8.07  6.16  100.00  22663   
62 45.02  30.81  5.58 1.69  10.32  6.57  100.00  22316   
63 37.21  34.16  5.65 2.41  13.32  7.25  100.00  22022   
64 28.00  33.86  5.93 6.15  18.00  8.07  100.00  21907   
65 14.40  0.94  2.56  65.65  9.51  6.94  100.00  21868   
66 1.89  0.00 0.00  90.17  1.13  6.81  100.00  21930   
67 1.42  0.00 0.00  90.20  1.04  7.34  100.00  22196   
68 1.16  0.00 0.00  90.05  0.98  7.81  100.00  22491   
69 0.81  0.00 0.00  89.91  0.98  8.29  100.00  22623   
70 0.66  0.00 0.00  89.94  0.89  8.51  100.00  22811   
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51 5.43  2.66  2.23  0.00  0.02  0.52  26128   
52 5.67  2.77  2.28  0.00  0.02  0.60  25229   
53 5.62  2.75  2.26  0.00  0.03  0.57  24032   
54 6.02  3.15  2.19  0.00  0.06  0.62  22896   
55 6.55  3.43  2.30  0.00  0.14  0.69  21451   
56 7.71  3.95  2.46  0.00  0.56  0.74  20080   
57 8.32  4.25  2.61  0.00  0.71  0.76  18323   
58 9.45  4.85  2.84  0.00  0.95  0.81  16894   
59 11.26 5.66  3.08  0.00  1.68  0.84  15501   
60 14.48 6.64  3.66  0.12  3.06  1.01  14319   
61 21.46 7.67  3.62  0.75  8.21  1.21  13059   
62 22.25 8.31  4.20  1.29  7.33  1.11  11139   
63 27.26 8.90  4.31  1.94  10.60  1.52  9699   
64 36.83 7.97  6.22  3.29  17.53  1.82  8333   
65 57.35 1.27  2.89  45.54  6.17  1.48  6403   
66 92.28 0.00  0.00  89.09  1.65  1.54  4548   
67 78.2  0.00  0.00  70.07  4.76  3.37  1156   
68 75.92 0.00  0.00  67.89  4.91  3.12  897 
69 78.64 0.14  0.00  70.61  4.35  3.54  735 
70 80.07 0.00  0.00  72.71  4.25  3.10  612 
Note. Includes only the four major sectors. Income categories are defined in the appendix, Table A1. 
 
The (gross) outflow probabilities from work to the other states are presented in Panel 
B. We may note a gradual increase in the total outflow from work between the age of 51 
and 61 - from 5 percent to 21 percent.
  19 In the following age groups, outflow from 
work increases dramatically until it reaches a peak at the age of 66 (9 out of 10 who are 
still working at the age of 65 exit work before the age of 66). The outflow from work to 
an occupational pension is highest in the 61-65 age groups - between 6 and 18 percent 
on average for the four major agreements. In comparison, very few people exit early by 
claiming early receipt of the national old age pension. It may be noted that 4-5 percent 
of workers who retire after the age of 65 are classified as occupational pensioners. 
                                                 
19 Note that the first year serves as a qualifying period for these calculations, as individuals must be working to be 
qualified for transitions. Moreover age is measured in the second year of each two-year panel, and on December 31. 
This means, assuming that the average birthday is June 30, that the average transition age is obtained by subtracting 
1½ years from the age concerned.  
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  21 4.1.2  Aggregate labor demand 
Next, our labor gap measure is presented in a number of different ways. First we exem-
plify how the measure of the employment fluctuation is constructed. Figure 1 illustrates 
employment (in logs), a quadratic trend, and a linear trend in a single industry (Trans-

























Figure 1 Annual employment (in logs) in an industry (60-63 transport and storage), a linear and 
a quadratic trend (estimated by OLS), 1987-2004. 
 
In the middle period, 1992-2000, indicated by two vertical lines, is our study period 
for the retirement decision. Over this period there were quite large swings in employ-
ment. As can be seen for this particularly industry, the employment gap measure (i.e. 
the vertical distance between actual and predicted employment, either from the linear or 
quadratic trends) bears a close resemblance to the general market conditions for the 
period. As mentioned earlier, there is no a priori way of determining how the trend 
should be constructed, and it may be noted that (for this industry) the quadratic trend 
vis-à-vis the linear trend results in different sizes (and sometimes different signs) for the 
employment gap. 
















































Figure 2 GDP gap (percent of potential GDP), and residual employment (
)
jt Z ) with a) a quad-
ratic and b) a linear time trend, annual (weighted) mean 
(Source: GDP-gap is annual mean of quarterly data, taken from National Institute of economic research, 2006, 
www.konj.se) 
 
We can conclude that our measure of the labor demand clearly seems comparable 
with the GDP gap (GDP as a percentage of potential GDP), shown in Figure 2 
(borrowed from the National Institute of Economic Research, 2006), which is an alter-
native and perhaps more generally used definition of the business cycle. Although our 
simple measures (one with a quadratic trend and the other with a linear trend) seem to 
present roughly the same picture of the economic turbulence of the period they also, 
however, suggest a quicker recovery than the GDP gap measure. It is also clear that the 
exact levels are different, but this is perhaps what we should expect.
20 Notice that the 
sizes of our measures differ depending on whether we employ a linear or a quadratic 
time trend, but it is what we should expect, since the quadratic trend by construction 
will render a smaller residual compared to the linear one (cf. Figure 1). (However, one 
should keep in mind the different scale when interpreting the marginal effects.) In the 
following, we discuss results focusing on the quadratic trend, however, since separate 
analyses using the two resulting employment gap measures showed that the choice of 
measure only had a minor impact on qualitative interpretation of the final results.  
                                                 
20 A number of explanations for this seem reasonable, e.g., our measure relies on employment alone, while the GDP 
gap includes, for instance, consumption, investments, etc. The specification of the trend is moreover different. Note 
that the GDP gap measure is the annual mean of quarterly data. 
















Figure 3 Percentile values of the employment gap on industry level ( jt Z ), 1987-2004, weighted 
by industry employment 
 
Thus it seems that the chosen measure of the labor demand relatively well captures 
the market conditions of the period. Also, when looking at the residual employment 
measure (using a quadratic time trend) in more depth by studying the distribution across 
industries, one can conclude that there, importantly, is a large variation between indus-
tries. The distribution of the residual employment across industries, by year, is 
presented in Figure 3.
21 The large variation between industries is in this figure quite 
striking: In 1994, in the depth of the depression, the median employment gap was about 
-2 percent (i.e., in 50 percent of industries, employment was 2 percent below the trend 
or lower). In the same year the employment gap at the 5
th and the 95
th percentiles 
spanned from about -17 percent to about +4 percent. As a result, it may be concluded 
that there were industries that were hit very badly by the depression, as well as indus-
tries that seem to have managed relatively well (in terms of employment). 
                                                 
21 These data are weighted by industry employment.  





















































Figure 4 Residual employment ( jt Z ) in four labor markets sectors, weighted, only individual-
year observations in risk group (i.e., working in t-1) 
 
We now turn to the micro data, which are available for the period 1992-2000, and 
compare the employment gap by the four major types of collective agreements (private, 
blue and white collar workers, central government and local government employees). 
These types show up in varying degrees in different industries (as noted, again, by the 
cross tabulation of the number of individual-year observations for SNI-coding and 
collective agreement in the appendix, Table A2). The business cycle is therefore, to 
some extent, different for the different sectors of the labor market. Figure 4 illustrates 
this in more detail. It presents the 5
th, 50
th, and the 95
th percentile values of the business 
cycle measure during the micro data period. Note that these percentile values, unlike 
those in Figure 3, represent individuals (in the risk group) and not industries.
22  
A few points are worth noting. First, there is, again, a large variation (as measured by 
the 95
th- 5
th percentile range) in the employment gap outcome between individuals in 
the same collective agreement. This is particularly the case for privately employed 
persons, but also for central government employees. For individuals in the local 
government sector, however, the 95
th- 5
th percentile range in the employment gap is 
relatively small. This is, as noted above, a result of the fact that such employees are 
                                                 
22 As only the risk group is included here, the first observation year is the second year of micro data. 
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  25 concentrated in a rather small number of industries. Second, one can see a notable 
difference between the public and the private sectors in that the employment gap devel-
ops differently over time. Among private-sector employees there was a more or less 
continuous increase between 1993-2000 in the 50
th percentile, while among state 
employees the median first decreased in 1993-1995, and then increased in the period 
thereafter. Among individuals employed in the local government sector, the variation 
over time is smaller, and furthermore the drop seems to occur relatively late in the sam-
ple, in 1997.  
We now turn to the following set of graphs, which compares the group which 
decided to retire with an occupational pension and the group that continued working, 
with respect to the employment gap measure. These figures will give a first indication if 
the raw data support our hypothesis that aggregate labor demand has an impact on early 
retirement. If declining markets imply that older workers retire at a higher rate, then the 
residual employment should be more negative for those who left work compared with 
those that stayed.  
The relationship between the aggregate employment gap and early retirement via the 
occupational pension shows the expected sign in the public sector, but not in the private 
sector before 1996. We expect to find no significant difference in the employment gap 
for blue collar workers since, before 1996, blue collar workers had no access to an 
occupational pension before the age of 65 as their agreement did not permit early with-
drawal then.
 23 We may therefore want to divide the sample into one period for the early 
1990s and one containing the later part. 
In Figure 5, the sample is divided into the period before and after 1996. It shows that, 
before 1996, we have the “wrong” sign for the difference in the private sector, while, in 
the period thereafter, the sign is as expected for blue collar workers. One explanation, of 
course, might be the new occupational pension plan implemented in 1996 for blue collar 
workers. A tightening of the eligibility rules for disability insurance might also have 
contributed, as more employees would then (have to) choose routes out of the labor 
                                                 
23 Note that sector affiliation within the private sector had to be predicted on the basis of a probability model. This 
imputation might therefore introduce errors: observations of early withdrawal of occupational pension income among 
blue collar workers might be due to white collar workers being wrongly coded as blue collar workers. 
26  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees force other than disability insurance, for instance an occupational pension. In the public 
sector, the data suggest that we have the expected sign for the difference throughout the 
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Figure 5 Employment gap (mean) for workers and recent occupational pensioners (conditional 
on work in previous period), and t-ratio of the difference in means, by labor market sector and 
time period 
It is likely that these observations correspond to economic trends in the different 
sectors during the period. In the initial stages of the crisis - before 1996 - employment in 
the private sector mostly declined as a result of the bad times, while the public sector 
reacted relatively little in terms of retiring elderly workers. However, when government 
budget deficits finally became too alarming, they resulted in large cutbacks in 
employment in the public sector, which were partly achieved by means of early retire-
ments. 
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  27 4.2 Regression  analysis 
4.2.1 Retirement  probability 
In the former section we saw that the descriptive analysis, on the whole, support the 
hypothesis that individuals who retired early via an occupational pension to a greater 
extent were employed in industries that faced more severe economic turbulence in terms 
of declining employment, compared to individuals who instead continued working. 
There seems to be differences between different occupational pension plans and 
between different years. Next we continue the analysis by examining retirement out-
comes in a multivariate analysis to control for differences in individual characteristics, 
industry, etc., to see if these may explain observed outcomes.  
The main results are summarized in Table 2, which presents the key parameters of 
the LPM model. In this table, each cell presents estimates from a separate regression. In 
specification A in the first row, we let the employment gap have different effects over 
labor market sectors but the same effect over the whole period within each sector. The 
estimates support the impression given by the previous figures. Hence, we find a pattern 
of negative and significant effects for occupational pensioners in the central and local 
government sectors, where occupational pension usage is more accentuated in declining 
markets. Partly, this might be due to the fact that the utilization of occupational 
pensions as an early retirement vehicle is highly developed in the central and local 
government sectors, but small among the white and, particularly, among blue collar 
workers in the private sector. This is supported by the differences in the estimated age 
fixed effects from the same specification, which are presented in Table 3. 
28  IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees Table 2 Retirement probabilities by labor market sector, specifications A, B, and C 
     Central gov. 
empl. 




A) Z(t-1)  -0.181***  -0.203**  -0.016  0.035 
       
  Obs.    10013 27801 19169 22285 
B)  Z(t-1)*I(year<=1996)  -0.115**  -0.254** 0.002 0.042 
 Z(t-1)*I(year>1996)  -0.336***  -0.141  -0.045*  0.026 
             
  Obs.    10013 27801 19169 22285 
C)  Z(t-1)*I(year<=1996)  -0.116**  -0.245** 0.002 0.044 
 Z(t-1)*I(year>1996)  -0.331***  -0.148  -0.044*  0.019 
  controls for municipality  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
  Obs. 10013 27801 19169 22285 
Note. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Robust standard errors. Includes ages 59-67.  All specifications include gender-
specific controls for pension qualifying income, age fixed effects, year fixed effects and industry-specific fixed 
effects. Generated labor demand variable (Z), derivations from quadratic trend. 
 
These results tell us that the down-sizing that occurred in the public sector in the 
1990s was to some extent achieved by adjusting the employment of older workers. They 
thus confirm that older employees were given the opportunity to obtain an occupational 
pension when layoffs were necessary. Early retirement benefits, including job security 
agreements effectively subsidized workforce reductions. In the private sector, on the 
other hand, the reductions (expansions) seem to have been carried out in a way that is 
not systematically linked to our employment gap measure. It might be that, in the 
private sector, aggregate employment shocks affect employment in other age groups 
(i.e., those younger than 58 years of age) rather than the employment of older workers. 
In addition, labor force reductions might have been implemented via other channels 
than occupational pensions.  
Above we noted that the effects seemed to differ in the samples before 1996 and after 
1996. In an alternative estimation, specification B, also shown in Table 2, we investi-
gate whether this difference in effects remains when we control for other variables. The 
results are pretty much in line with Figure 5. The results indicate that the largest effect 
is found among the central government employees in the post-1996 period and among 
local government employees in the pre-1997 period. For blue collar workers in the 
private sector, the estimates suggest that there was a small negative effect of aggregate 
employment on early retirement in the later period from 1997 to 2000. It is however 
relatively small and only significant at the 10 percent level. 
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retirement with occupational pension, by labor market sector 
Variable  Central gov. empl.  Local gov.
empl. 
Blue collar workers  White collar 
workers 
      
age59  (ref.)      
age60 0.008  0.007***  0.002  0.008*** 
age61  0.121*** 0.057*** 0.007*** 0.035*** 
age62  0.076*** 0.050*** 0.009*** 0.030*** 
age63  0.067*** 0.087*** 0.011*** 0.046*** 
age64  0.112*** 0.268*** 0.012*** 0.057*** 
age65  0.047*** 0.064*** 0.006*** 0.036*** 
age66 -0.004  0.001  -0.001  0.010** 
age67 0.044**  0.008  -0.003**  0.014* 
      
Obs.  10013 27801 19169 22285 
Note. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Robust standard errors. See Table 2 for notes. 
 
It is possible that employment reductions are centered in a few distinct geographical 
locations. The driving factor causing early retirement might then be linked to the eco-
nomic circumstances at the local level rather than at the industry level. According to the 
estimates in specification C, shown in the last row of Table 2, however, the results are 
not sensitive to including controls for municipality.  
Another set of estimates, presented in Table 4 and Table 5, shows that the findings 
seem robust against other alternative specifications. These estimates represent a com-
mon effect independently of age group and of labor market sector. First, in Table 4, 
results with the quadratic time trend specification are shown. As can be noted we obtain 
the expected negative and significant effect in all specifications. The quantitative result 
vary w.r.t. how ambitiously we specified the model. Whether or not year-specific con-
trols are included in the model has a quite large influence on the size, but not the sign of 
the key results (cf. col. 3 and 4). This could be expected, as there is substantial variation 
in the employment gap over time that is common for almost all industries (as shown in 
Figure 3). An exclusion of period fixed effects implies that this variation is allowed to 
influence the estimated effect. Also, holding industry constant has a substantial influ-
ence. Second, as the results presented in Table 5 show, there is practically very little 
change in the results if we use a linear trend instead of a quadratic one. We get a smaller 
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ures with the quadratic time trend
 vis-à-vis the linear one.
 24
Correlation within industries over time may cause interdependence that the usual 
robust (unclustered) standard errors do not account for. By instead using standard errors 
adjusted for intra-group (cluster) correlation, presented in brackets in Table 4 and Table 
5, we find that the significance levels become lower. This could be expected if there is 
autocorrelation in employment within industries. Nevertheless, for most specifications, 
the key parameter remains significant at the 10 or 5 percent level.  
Table 4 Linear probability model estimates with quadratic time trend 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Z(t-1)  -0.040 -0.063 -0.074 -0.046 
  0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
  [0.038] [0.034]*  [0.034]** [0.025]* 
      
Age  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-specific  fixed  effects   Yes Yes Yes 
By-gender control for qualifying income      Yes  Yes 
Education  dummies     Yes Yes 
Labor market sector control      Yes  Yes 
Year  dummies      Yes 
      
Obs.  79268 79268 79268 79268 
Note. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Robust standard errors presented in italics. Adjusted standard errors for intra-
group (cluster) correlation in brackets. Includes ages 59-67. See Table 2 for notes. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Introducing controls for local unemployment at the county level in the specification changes inference very little 
(not shown). Probit models (with or without random effects) reproduce almost identical qualitative inference 
compared with the LPM.  
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  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Z(t-1)  0.006 -0.064 -0.074 -0.044 
  0.012 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 [0.048]  [0.035]*  [0.036]**  [0.025]* 
      
Age  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-specific  fixed  effects   Yes Yes Yes 
By-gender control for qualifying income      Yes  Yes 
Education dummies      Yes  Yes 
Labor market sector control      Yes  Yes 
Year  dummies      Yes 
      
Obs.  79268 79268 79268 79268 
Note. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Robust standard errors presented in italics. Adjusted standard errors for intra-
group (cluster) correlation in brackets. Includes ages 59-67. Generated business cycle variable (Z), derivations from 
linear trend.  
 
How much of the observed retirement is a result of the variations in the aggregate 
labor demand during the period? One way to quantify this is to multiply the slope coef-
ficient from the LPM with a real change in the employment gap, say 5 percent, judging 
from previous figures. One can then conclude that this employment gap corresponds to 
about 1 percentage point, or about 12 percent, of the retirement hazard for the older 
employees aged 59-67 in the central and local government sectors. 
4.2.2  Realized pensions in declining markets 
The other question we wanted to investigate was whether there is a “cyclical premium” 
in the realized pensions of early retirees – which could be an indication that employers 
reduce staff by making favorable pension offers to induce early retirement via this pen-
sion system.  
The estimates are presented in Table 6 and Table 7. As we have found that the 
marginal effects of employment gap fluctuations differ before and after 1996, we have 
estimated separate models for the two time periods.
25 According to the estimates in the 
specification where we control for education, year, labor market sector, and industry, 
there seems to be a nonlinear V-shaped (or U-shaped) relationship between employment 
                                                 
25 Standard errors adjusted for intra-group (cluster) correlation within industries changes inference very little. 
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 Note that we control for the pension qualifying 
income and that only occupational pension benefits is included in the dependent vari-
able. The benefit level is hence higher when the residual employment is negative, but 
there is also a slightly higher pension level when the residual employment is positive 
(all compared to “normal times”, i.e., close to ‘zero’ residual employment). For 1993-
1996 (see Table 6), the cyclical premium becomes insignificant if we control for labor 
market sector and industry, meaning that the variation is explained by differences 
between types of collective agreement and industries rather than by variation in the 
employment gap. For the period 1996-2000 (see Table 7), however, the cyclic premium 
effects remain significant when these controls are carried out.  
The premium estimates linked to a change in the employment gap of -0.05 are indi-
cated in the bottom line of the table. These suggest that pensions (in relation to pension 
qualifying income) are inflated by around 8 percent for negative employment gap 
changes, compared to times when the deviation in aggregate industry employment from 
to the trend is close to zero. The effect is symmetric; the effect linked to a positive 
change in the employment gap of +0.05 is 7 percent.  
Hence, the conclusion is that increased pensions may have been used to make indi-
viduals accept early retirement in “bad” times. In “good times” the evidence of 
increased pensions might indicate that these function as rewards (without increasing 
retirements) to senior employees in companies with a booming economy. These may 
arise because, e.g., employees (that would retire anyway) expect extra pensions and that 
employers feel they can reward their employees. An alternative explanation is that as 
wages grow more rapidly in “good times” so does the expected future pension burden 
for the employer. This was especially true for the defined benefit schemes in the occu-
pational pension plans of the period.  
The usual assumption that pensions follow the standard formula stipulated in the 
prevailing contracts might therefore be questioned. The reason is that pensions are 
subject to negotiations between employers and employees, something which is not often 
pointed out in the literature; the extent to which this happens has never been estimated 
before.  
IFAU – Economic fluctuations and retirement of older employees  33 Finally, the point estimate of the elasticity of the pension qualifying income on pensions 
(i.e. the slope coefficient of lnW) lies in the expected range in all specifications, i.e., just 
under unity. It may be noted that a scatter plot of the dependent variable and lnW 
suggests that the pension qualifying income explains the major part of the variation in 
the pension benefit. 
Table 6 Estimates of occupational pension benefits; new early occupational pensioners 59-64, 
1993-1995 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
lnW  0.922*** 0.928*** 0.943*** 0.941*** 0.973*** 
  0.045 0.042 0.036 0.035 0.029 
I(Z<0)  0.019 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.015 
  0.034 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.024 
Z 0.399  0.638  0.823*  1.042**  0.926** 
  0.610 0.453 0.390 0.330 0.324 
Z*  I(Z<0)  -0.755  -1.457* -1.876*** -2.040*** -1.756*** 
  0.939 0.582 0.524 0.473 0.449 
       
Education  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes     
Sector  dummies  Yes  Yes    
Industry  dummies  Yes     
       
Obs.  1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 
R
2  0.714 0.694 0.693 0.691 0.688 
       
Implied effect on 
dependent variable  
of a change in Z  
     
from 0 to -0.05  0.037  0.045  0.062*  0.068**  0.057* 
  [0.322] [0.099] [0.010] [0.004] [0.011] 
from 0 to +0.05  0.012  0.032  0.041  0.052**  0.046** 
  [0.513] [0.159] [0.035] [0.002] [0.004] 
Note. Dependent variable is the logarithm of occupational pension benefits. Robust standard errors in italics. * 
p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. P-values in brackets. Sample restricted to age 59-64. Only observations where 
occupational pension was the maximum income in the current period and work income was the maximum income in 
the previous period are included. 
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1996-2000 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
lnW  0.857*** 0.870*** 0.933*** 0.933*** 0.952*** 
  0.024 0.024 0.018 0.018 0.017 
I(Z<0)  0.031 0.038 0.041  0.044* 0.042 
  0.024 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.022 
Z  1.356**  1.548** 2.353*** 2.315*** 2.133*** 
  0.458 0.552 0.571 0.534 0.519 
Z*  I(Z<0)  -2.319**  -1.969** -2.921*** -2.876*** -2.681*** 
  0.759 0.639 0.632 0.604 0.576 
       
Education  dummies  X X X X   
Year  dummies  X X X     
Sector  dummies  X  X    
Industry  dummies  X     
       
Obs.  2094 2094 2094 2094 2094 
R
2  0.684 0.663 0.656 0.656 0.654 
       
Implied effect on 
dependent variable  
of a change in Z  
     
from 0 to -0.05  0.079**  0.059**  0.070**  0.072***  0.070*** 
  [0.001] [0.007] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
from 0 to +0.05  0.068**  0.077**  0.118***  0.116***  0.107*** 
  [0.003] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Note. See Table 6. 
 
5 Summary 
This paper addresses the importance of demand side factors in the retirement decision. 
The aim of this study is to investigate employers’ influence on older wage-earners’ 
propensity to opt for early retirement rather than continued employment. The empirical 
strategy is to use deviations in aggregate employment from the long run trend, measured 
at the industry level, as the key variable of interest in a reduced form retirement model 
of micro retirement behavior.  
The empirical results indicate that the probability of claiming early retirement via an 
occupational pension is affected by declining sectoral employment, since more people 
will enter into early retirement when markets are declining. One reasonable interpreta-
tion is that labor demand has an important influence on early retirement behavior. 
Industry fluctuations in employment provides considerable (and presumably) exogenous 
variation, both between and within industries, and this identifies the effect. The effect is 
pronounced in the public sector, and in the late 1990s. The down-sizing that occurred in 
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ment of older workers.  
As employers may offer relatively favorable early retirement offers to induce retire-
ment, we have also examined the relationship between pension replacement rates and 
industry employment. We find empirical evidence suggesting that employers behave in 
this way: The realized pension replacement rates were more favorable during declining 
markets than during normal markets. But the evidence also point at a significant pre-
mium being paid out in expanding markets, which might be explained as rewards to 
senior employees in good times. 
Of course, there may be a rationale for restructuring the labor force via such early 
retirements if the supply is not met by demand (for example for special skills). From the 
viewpoint of society as a whole, however, early retirement offers made to healthy and 
productive individuals constitute a considerable cost since they result in production 
losses and, in most cases, the permanent loss of valuable labor resources. From a busi-
ness and individual perspective, however, there may nonetheless be several logical 
explanations as to why early retirement pension solutions are financially more advanta-
geous than continued employment. Ready access to early retirement benefits and vari-
ous job security agreements help employers in this respect, since they effectively subsi-
dize workforce reductions, without employers baring the full cost of such reductions. 
However, for the economy as a whole it is doubtful whether this is a good practice con-
sidering that the early retirement offers were most common in the public sector and 
hence, in the end, paid for by the tax payers.   
A discussion of work incentives among older employees must include not only the 
weak work incentives of the individual but also the high labor costs of older workers, 
since they give employers incentives to retire old workers via favorable pension offers. 
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Tabell A 1 Income types (jointly amounting to total income) 
Path abbreviation  Income type  Definition 
1. WORK  Work  Work earnings, net of sickness insurance, parents' allowance, 
unemployment allowance, unemployment compensation, care 
allowance. 
2. DI+SI  Disability pension   Disability pension 
 Sickness  insurance 
benefits  
Sickness insurance benefits; tax-free and taxable sickness 
benefit, maternity allowance, disease carrier allowance and 
sick pay guarantee allowance. From the 15
th sick day. (Since 
1992, the first two weeks of a sickness period have been paid 
by the employer.) 
3. UI  Unemployment insurance 
benefits 
Unemployment insurance benefits; unemployment benefit fund 
(A-kassa), ALU, KAS, daily allowance and training allowance 
(dagpenning and utbildningsbidrag) in labor market training 
programs. 
4. OAP  Public old age pension   Old age pension 
  Partial pension   Public partial pension  
5. OCCP  Occupational pension   Occupational pensions. Blue collar workers, white collar 
workers, central government, government-owned companies 
(only 1994-1999), local government, and individually 
negotiated occupational pensions.  
6. OTHER  Private pension   Private pension; sum of private pension insurance/taxable life 
annuity 
  Passive business   Income from passive business; includes income from private 
firms and from trading companies 
  Capital   Capital income; from banks, shares, bonds and other valuable 
papers  
 Transfer  payments,  social 
assistance and other 
benefits.  
Transfer payments and benefits; includes housing allowance 
for families with children, the supplement for pensioners, the 
special complement for pensioners, and the complementary 
supplement for pensioners, and social assistance.  
Note: OCCP also includes special pension payments from the Trygghetsrådet, for example, as mentioned in 
Section 2. 
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and aggregation rule of two-digit level SNI-codes 
 Collective  agreement     
Industry  
(SNI-code) 







1 36  31  730  471  1268  1 
2  200  2 365 410 977  2 
5  0  0  7 20 27  5 
10  6  0 13 10 29  10-14 
11  6 0 1 2 9  10-14 
13  152  0  30 220 402  10-14 
14  4  3 110 131 248  10-14 
15  79  0 1963 2060 4102  15+16 
16  0  0  0 88 88  15+16 
17  11  7 545 222 785  17-19 
18  164  2 264 117 547  17-19 
19 0  0  48  53  101  17-19 
20 27  8  1486  734  2255  20 
21  276  18 1145 1886 3325  21 
22  160  26 1700 2199 4085  22 
23  2  0  0 175 177  23+24 
24  49  15  507 1481 2052  23+24 
25 6  0  782  642  1430  25 
26 27  0  867  694  1588  26 
27  121  0 1052 1576 2749  27 
28  1248  6 3449 1616 6319  28 
29  370  41 2409 4121 6941  29 
30  28  0  92 136 256  30-33 
31  182  1  545 1050 1778  30-33 
32  141  0  379 1176 1696  30-33 
33  47  17  219 1132 1415  30-33 
34  15  13  776 2805 3609  34+35 
35 324  0  322  904  1550  34+35 
36 393  10  920  556  1879  36+37 
37  0  0 22 32 54  36+37 
40 349  1061  93  587  2090  40+41 
41 0  42  0  4  46  40+41 
451  4  14 558 253 829  45.1+45.2 
+45.5 
452  1317  238 3233 2580 7368  45.1+45.2 
+45.5 
453  30  36 1573 1530 3169  45.3+45.4 
454 2  22  705  482  1211  45.3+45.4 
455  0  0 55 42 97  45.1+45.2 
+45.5 
50  3  18  978 2635 3634  50 
51 96  58  1841  9228  11223  51 
521  8  16 3787 1284 5095  52.1 
522  278  17 432 143 870  52.2-5 
523 1479  13  82  90  1664  52.2-5 
524  18  4 3488 1537 5047  52.2-5 
525  0  0 48 39 87  52.2-5 
526  0  2 150 131 283  52.6 
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Industry  
(SNI-code) 







527 0  0  95  61  156  52.7 
55  39  39 1322 1029 2429  55 
60  1107  922 3213 1646 6888  60-63 
61  57  10  0 414 481  60-63 
62  1  3  25 564 593  60-63 
63  564  458  381 1478 2881  60-63 
64 4807  15  272  524  5618  64 
65  700  49 1350 2437 4536  65+67.1 
66  45  12  805 1043 1905  66+67.2 
671  18  0  67 150 235  65+67.1 
672  0  0  28 126 154  66+67.2 
70  188 1555 1556 1760 5059  70 
71  6  1 181 171 359  71 
72  144  33  0 1656 1833  72 
73 1176  2  65  613  1856  73 
74 2122  260  1677  9020  13079  74 
75 12072  1307  147  171  13697  75+99 
80 3186  6542  142  2047  11917  80 
851 222  22431  103  2755  25511  85.1+85.2 
852  7  0  0 31 38  85.1+85.2 
853 414  51946  314  1784  54458  853 
90  0 133 156 145 434  90 
91  177 2062  724 3051 6014  91 
92  815  273  571 1605 3264  92 
93  7 101 336 379 823  93 
99  0  0  0 19 19  75+99 
                    
Total 35532  89895  51301  81963  258691     
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